Following the fall of Damascus to the armed Syrian opposition and the reported escape of Bashar al-Assad to Moscow on Sunday, December 8, 2024, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei convened a meeting with a group of Iranians described as representing “different groups.” During the meeting, he voiced his frustration over Assad’s ouster and outlined both his personal stance and that of the Iranian government on the rapidly unfolding events in Syria. These events began with the fall of Aleppo to the opposition forces on Friday, November 29, 2024. The Iranian supreme leader also took to X, formerly Twitter, to share a series of posts expressing his perspective on the situation. He attributed the cascading events in Syria to regional actors, particularly Türkiye, while emphasizing that the primary drivers, in his view, were the United States and Israel. He also blamed Iran’s inability to assist Assad on alleged US air operations that, he claimed, blocked the delivery of critical supplies to Syria. Yet, in another post, Khamenei acknowledged that Iran could not act as a substitute for the Syrian army. He argued that the mobilized forces were intended to support the army in its defense, not to fight in its place.
When examining statements of various Iranian officials alongside those of Khamenei, significant contradictions and discrepancies are apparent. However, as the ruling establishment’s highest authority and key architect of its policies, Khamenei’s remarks carry the most weight. This report explores the strategic and ideological implications of his remarks, delving into the underlying concerns of Khamenei and the ruling elite regarding the sweeping changes in Syria. For Iranian leaders, the events in Syria represent a seismic shock, surpassing even the deaths of Hassan Nasrallah, Hashem Safi al-Din, and Ebrahim Raisi. More profoundly, the supreme leader’s primary concern lies in the potential erosion of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine, the foundational theory of governance established in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Any weakening of this doctrine in Iran’s neighboring enclaves or among its ideological bases could have an internal cascading effect, threatening the establishment’s core and posing a significant ideological challenge. This raises urgent questions about how the Iranian leadership will address this dilemma. The following parts of the report outline potential strategies and scenarios for navigating the challenges to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine and the broader implications for the establishment’s stability.
Khamenei’s Position on the Events in Syria
Khamenei’s position evolved significantly from the onset of the events to their conclusion, revealing the level of shock faced by the Iranian leadership. This shift reflects underlying fears about the unfolding events, concerns over Iran’s diminishing influence, and anxiety about the potential weakening of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine and Khamenei’s guardianship.
Accusing the Armed Opposition:
At the onset of the Syrian armed opposition’s advance toward Aleppo and its liberation on November 29, 2024, Khamenei on X on December 1, 2024, referred to the opposition as excommunication groups and accused them of diverting attention from the Palestinian cause and shifting focus from the malicious reality of the Zionist regime. After Assad’s fall and his escape to Moscow, followed by the opposition forces entering Damascus on December 8, 2024, Khamenei wrote on December 11, 2024, two days after Assad’s fall, that “There is no doubt that what happened in Syria is the result of a joint American-Zionist plot.” On the same day, he accused Türkiye of orchestrating events in Syria in collaboration with the United States and Israel. Later that day, during a meeting with segments of the Iranian public, he sought to validate his perspective by citing the entry of Israeli tanks into Syrian territory, advancing close to Damascus.
While Khamenei extensively spoke about resistance, framing it as a belief rooted in the hearts of people rather than military equipment that can be broken, dismantled and destroyed, he did not address the Syrian people’s plight, their violated dignity under the Ba’athist regime, or the widespread detention centers across Syria. His discourse on resistance seemed to accept these aforesaid realities. If one takes Khamenei’s argument that resistance means opposition to hegemony, as reiterated in his rhetoric, then the Syrian people, marginalized in their own state, had a right to revolt against Iranian and Shiite dominance, which sought to distort their heritage, beliefs, and civilization.
Absolving Himself of Blame and Accusing the Syrian Army:
Khamenei appeared intent on addressing the Iranian and Shiite public to counter doubts and accusations of failure or negligence. To this end, he directed criticism at the Syrian army, stating that it was neither logical nor acceptable to the public for the Iranian military to fight in the place of the Syrian army. In other words, according to Khamenei, the failure to adequately support Assad was not due to Iranian shortcomings but rather to the Syrian army’s negligence in combat. He argued that the alternative of Iranians directly fighting against the armed opposition in Syria was unacceptable. However, Khamenei did not stop there. He went as far distancing himself from the participation of Shiite youth from Iran and Iraq in the Syrian conflict, as well as from the Syrian army’s struggle against the armed opposition and the Syrian army. He remarked, “Of course, many of our own youth, our Basij forces, were impatient, eager and insistent on going, and many of them did. We didn’t even agree with that, they repeatedly requested, asked questions, wrote to me, sent messages, and even pleaded for permission to go to Syria and confront the enemy. Naturally, it was not appropriate or advisable at the time. However, they found ways to go regardless.”
Khamenei’s allocation of blame for the failure in Syria extended beyond the Syrian army to include certain Shiite mobilization forces from Iraq, Iran, and within Syria itself. He accused these groups of negligence and inaction, despite the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani’s efforts to train and prepare them. He stated, “Martyr Soleimani trained, armed, organized, and prepared a group of several thousand young men from among their own people in Syria and they stood firm. Later, of course, some among them, some of their own military leaders, unfortunately, created issues, caused problems, and unfortunately abandoned something that was ultimately in their own best interest.” Thus, Khamenei first accused the Syrian army of negligence, then distanced himself from the involvement of youth and militias in Syria, and finally criticized these very youth and militias, whom Soleimani had trained and organized, for negligence and creating obstacles. However, his claim that Shiite youths went to Syria without his approval is inconsistent with Shiite customs, the principles of Wilayat al-Faqih, and the rulings derived from this doctrine.
From Khamenei’s perspective, the primary issue was not the Iranian strategy or the systematic plan to expand influence in Syria and Iraq, sow regional chaos, and bring in Shiite militias from Pakistan and Afghanistan for training and arming. Instead, he attributed the problem to the negligence of the Syrian army and the actions of Shiite youths who went to Syria without his explicit permission. He also criticized the militias for their military miscalculations in Syria. This perspective underscores Khamenei’s intent to reassert the authority of Wilayat al-Faqih and to bolster its standing in the face of rising doubt and dissatisfaction following a series of defeats, as will be highlighted in the following lines.
Significations of Khamenei’s Remarks: The Decline of Wilayat-e Faqih, A Project in Crisis
What occurred after October 7, 2023, marked a significant shift for the Americans and Israelis, and consequently, for the Iranians as well. A decision was made to dismantle the Iranian project and confront it directly, even if this led to a decisive confrontation with Iran. The events in Gaza, followed by developments in Lebanon and finally in Syria, were part of efforts to neutralize Tehran’s influence. During this period, several key figures close to Tehran, including Nasrallah, Safi al-Din, Fuad Shukr, Ismail Haniyeh, Saleh al-Arouri and Yahya Sinwar, were killed. In addition, a number of Iranian generals and military advisors were killed in Syria, with some targeted in Yemen. These incidents exposed the fragility of the Iranian project and the Iranian leadership’s inability to respond or even devise a strategy that could safeguard its investments, totaling billions of dollars and spanning more than 40 years, despite lacking the support of the Iranian people. These events point to two important significations:
A Fragile Iranian Project and Aging Actors:
Iran’s failure and the rapid collapse of its “Axis of Resistance,” were primarily triggered by external factors given the widespread concern in the region about the Iranian project resulting in efforts to confront it. However, it is important not to dismiss the role of a crucial internal factor that is even more dangerous, threatening the Iranian state and its ideological pillars. This factor is Iran’s aging leadership, its outdated cadres and theorists, and the inability of the ruling elite to generate new ideas or cultivate a new generation that believes in the revolution and its principles, or who would carry the revolutionary banner after them. Most of the leaders are elderly and no longer capable of creativity or innovation, compounded by the significant age gap between the youth and the neoconservatives who have held power since the onset of the Iranian revolution. When this revolutionary generation took over the actual power and ideological leadership after the revolution, it was a young generation capable of revolutionary activism. But after 40 years, this generation, with many members now in their 90s, has lost its revolutionary zeal. Instead of revolution, it is now creating unrest, concern, and chaos across the region. The project of exporting the revolution has crossed all red lines, becoming a burden even on countries that are not neighbors to Iran or its allies (as seen, for example, in Egypt, where the Houthis caused a collapse in Suez Canal revenues). Younger generations of Iranians have become increasingly disillusioned with the revolution and its principles, such as exporting it and investing billions of dollars to support foreign militias, while Iranians themselves suffer from severe inflation and a stifling economic crisis. This is compounded by the corruption of the ruling elite and the clergy, which becomes more evident each day. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about a revolution, revolutionary zeal, or an ideological project for this generation, the results of which have only been increasing life burdens, religious extremism, and an interest in superficialities rather than fundamentals.
The Decline of Wilayat al-Faqih:
The marginalization of Iran-backed proxies is reflective of another important point, which is the confinement of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih to the Iranian interior. The absolute Guardianship of the Jurist — according to Khomeini — is an all-encompassing theory, such that it is not limited by borders or confessions; it is not tied to Iranian geography. As a result, Khamenei calls himself the “Guardian of Islam and Muslims,” not just of Iranians or Shiites alone.
But this guardianship, which has extended to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, is now facing setbacks and challenges in these countries. Syria is the most important country for Iran as it borders Israel and is a vital crossing point that links Tehran and Beirut. Therefore, its loss is a strategic blow to Iran, as well as the severe weakening of Hezbollah in the recent war, and the blow to Hamas and Islamic Jihad (PIJ), as well as the pressure on Iraqi militias by the Najaf religious authority. The latter is demanding that these militias hand over their weapons to the state, similarly, they face pressures from a variety of international and regional actors. All of this has led to a reduction in the remit of Wilayat al-Faqih, and even its credibility among the Shiite community. Sudden setbacks and defeats, by their psychological nature, are followed by internal criticism and mutual accusations. The Iranian supreme leader relied on proxies to dominate, extend his authority, and unleash violence. Today, his authority has become almost confined to the Iranian interior. Even the Iranian interior itself is witnessing major disagreements and post-Khamenei arrangements, with the “reformists” winning the presidency and their ambition to reform the political system after Khamenei. Thus, the guardianship doctrine is facing a major dilemma, hence, this leads to questions related to future outcomes and scenarios.
Future Outcomes and Scenarios
Iran appears to be facing its biggest crisis since the revolution in 1979. It is in direct confrontation with both the region and the West. The efficiency of its internal apparatuses has decreased, largely due to the aging and intellectual stagnation among the ruling elite. Additionally, a large segment of the population is angry due to inflation, socioeconomic crises, and the failure of the ruling elite to find realistic solutions. There is also a significant gap between the revolutionary generation and the younger generations, especially the youth and women born in this century. The future outcomes and scenarios can be summarized as follows.
First Scenario: Intellectual and Practical Revisions:
This scenario assumes that Iranian strategists and theorists from the religious and seminary elites will conduct comprehensive intellectual reviews of all the policies adopted since 1979. This is in response to awareness that these policies have led to widespread unrest and anger, both internally and externally, toward the Iranian ruling elite. This scenario is supported by a group of Iranian “reformists” from different backgrounds. Some demand constitutional amendments to end the era of Wilayat al-Faqih and establish a democratic state. Other “reformists,” however, call for the implementation of the current Iranian Constitution without violations by “conservatives.” They believe its articles are sufficient for good governance, if not repeatedly violated by clerics. However, this scenario assumes reviews that go beyond merely constitutional revisions or amendments. It involves reviews that challenge the structure of “conservative” and traditionalist thought, given the internal and external failures it has caused.
On the other hand, the Iranian leadership appears to be persisting with the same policies, showing no sign of retreat or willingness to undertake any meaningful intellectual or practical reviews. To the Iranian decision-maker, such reviews seem akin to admitting failure, which is perceived as contradicting divine guidance. The supreme leader presents himself as the guardian of Islam and the Shiite sect on Earth, the representative of the Infallible Imam, who is, in turn, the representative of God. Consequently, failure is deemed impermissible, and defeats are justified as trials, tactics, or even framed as victories — such as when Naim Qassem recently claimed that Hezbollah achieved a greater victory than in 2006. However, the insistence on continuing along the same path, while seen by Iranian decision-makers as proof of resilience and effectiveness, actually reveals a deep fear of retreat. From their perspective, retreat signifies failure, which invites internal questioning and could lead to the establishment’s downfall or stagnation. Yet, persisting with unchanged policies ultimately threatens the establishment’s survival in the long run. This approach exacerbates existing problems, widens the gap between the ruling elites and the contemporary generation, and fuels growing anger — most recently evident in Syria.
Second Scenario: The Decline of the Project to Export the Iranian Revolution and Failure to Achieve Its Ends:
This scenario assumes the failure and decline of the project to export the Iranian revolution. By this, one is referring to exporting the revolution’s founding principles and rhetoric, the comprehensiveness of Wilayat al-Faqih, the centrality of its rulings, and other outcomes shaped by the revolutionary religious elite’s theories after 1979. This scenario envisions a decline (though not a complete collapse) of this project for valid reasons. These include the failure to conduct serious, meaningful reviews as proposed in the first scenario, and the growing challenges confronting the establishment domestically and internationally, such as the intellectual and generational gap between the revolution’s architects and the current generation of youth and women. However, the primary reason for this decline may ironically stem from what Khamenei and the religious elite see as a source of steadfastness and strength: their unyielding commitment to advancing the same revolutionary project without adaptation or reform.
If Khamenei chooses to continue with the same revolutionary approach and policies (a likely scenario), he risks driving the revolutionary project to failure or even collapse. In this sense, while Khomeini laid the foundation of the current ruling order, Khamenei may inadvertently pave the way for its downfall through policies that stifle internal talent, entrench tyranny, and transform the state into a republic of fear and violence. Externally, this approach is evident in his confrontations with the entire region, fostering widespread concern and unrest. The state’s actions have crossed regional and international red lines making its revolutionary export resemble, or even equate to, transnational terrorism. This disregard for boundaries and systems, combined with opening multiple fronts simultaneously, shows little consideration for Iran’s capacity to act effectively or to anticipate its adversaries’ reactions. Furthermore, the prioritization of reckless adventurism over prudent strategy has distorted Iran’s strategic vision. This has inflated Iran’s self-image in confrontation with regional and international powers possessing vastly superior technological, scientific, and military capabilities. Such vulnerabilities were exposed in incidents like the Hezbollah pager attacks, the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran, and Israel flying planes over Iranian airspace in the face of hapless Iranian air defenses.
All of this should have prompted Iran to reconsider its orientations, undertake meaningful internal reviews, pause to reflect, take corrective steps, and open genuine diplomatic channels with regional actors without ideological rigidity or attempts to bypass regional reconciliations and agreements. However, this has not happened, and it is unlikely to occur in a religiously authoritarian environment shaped by Wilayat al-Faqih and the atmosphere it has created and perpetuated.
Third Scenario: Renewal and Redeployment:
This scenario envisions Iran seeking to restore its position in the Middle East and the broader region by adopting new methods of escalation and confrontation, implementing its regional project in ways that are less costly and more strategic. Unlike the scenario of intellectual review, this approach does not entail reassessing or revising its ideological framework. Instead, it focuses on developing new tactics to advance the same project and policies while maintaining the foundational principles and outcomes of its governance theory. If one assumes that Iran will not relinquish its revolutionary agenda and persists in its policy of escalation and sowing instability in the region — a likely outcome based on remarks by Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, as well as those of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and leaders of Iraqi armed factions — then it will undoubtedly seek alternatives in Asia and other regions. Khamenei himself has emphasized the importance of the Axis of Resistance across Asia, potentially referring to expansion in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where conducive environments exist for advancing Iranian goals, including support for Shiite groups. Additionally, Iran may pursue closer cooperation with Eastern powers such as China and Russia as part of a broader strategy to align against the West. Alternatively, it may aim to refine and redeploy its tactics in its traditional areas of influence — such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon — despite past failures, signaling a determination to adapt and persist in these critical theaters.
The critical question remains: Can Iran secure a favorable position in the new, post-Assad Syria? In the short and medium term, this seems challenging. Tehran’s unwavering support for Assad has tarnished its reputation among the broader Syrian populace. Furthermore, official rhetoric from opposition figures, such as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa), and other opposition leaders is sharply critical of Tehran. Regional actors, particularly Türkiye and Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, backed the Syrian opposition primarily to weaken Iran’s influence in Syria. Consequently, the emerging Syrian political elites understand that their regional legitimacy and international backing hinge on achieving this objective: to completely expel Iran from Syria and reintegrate Syria into the Arab world, steering clear of Tehran’s destabilizing policies.
One can argue however that Tehran previously collaborated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq against US forces, so it might consider working with Syrian Islamists against Israel and the United States. This perspective is reinforced by Khamenei’s statement, “The occupied areas of Syria will be liberated by the hands of zealous Syrian youth; do not doubt that this will happen. America will not gain a foothold either, and with God’s grace, power, and strength, the resistance front will expel America from the region!”
However, the Syrian context is markedly different from that of Iraq or Afghanistan. Today, Syrian Islamists — let alone their political and ideological differences with Tehran — do not dominate power alone, even if they are prominent. The broader Syrian population, across various factions, largely opposes both the Ba’ath regime and Tehran. These factions are closely watching the new administration, assessing its actions, and alignment with Türkiye, the Gulf states, and other regional and international actors that have provided support according to specific conditions and standards to ensure political maneuvering space while maintaining international legitimacy.
Additionally, the Afghans and Iraqis liberated themselves from US forces, whereas the Syrians see their struggle as liberation from both Assad and Iran, one of his key backers. This unique dynamic makes it unlikely for Tehran to exploit the Syrian situation as it has in the past. That being said, even if the supply route to Hezbollah through Syria is disrupted, resulting in a significant impact, it does not necessarily equate to the group’s complete demise. For instance, the Houthis in Yemen lack a direct land route to Tehran, yet Iranian weapons still reach them through smuggling networks. Iran’s expertise in circumventing international law, including smuggling weapons and other illicit activities, ensures it can maintain its proxies. However, Syria’s strategic importance extends beyond supply routes. It has served as a corridor for military advisors and militias moving between Lebanon, Baghdad and Tehran without detection. With Assad’s fall, this dynamic will change significantly. Consequently, Iran stands to lose a vital ally and the most critical point in its so-called Axis of Resistance.
Conclusion
The Iranian ruling elite appears to be in a profound crisis due to the numerous challenges confronting the Iranian project. The theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which underpins governance in Tehran, is similarly in a precarious state. This is attributed to significant regional shifts and the severe setbacks experienced by Iran and its regional proxies, including Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, and the Ba’ath regime in Damascus. These challenges have not only strained Iran’s regional ambitions but have also affected the standing of the supreme leader and the credibility of Wilayat al-Faqih.
As explained, the doctrine now faces a potential path of decline and recession, marked by a gradual weakening of its influence both domestically and regionally. The inability to adapt to evolving regional and international dynamics could further erode its legitimacy and operational capabilities, leaving this theory of governance increasingly out of touch with contemporary realities.
Alternatively, Iran may seek restoration and escalation by doubling down on revolutionary principles and adopting more aggressive tactics to reassert Wilayat al-Faqih’s authority and relevance. This path would involve a revitalization of its ideological framework, coupled with intensified regional activities, to demonstrate its continued strength and influence.
However, the doctrine could also face an ongoing dilemma, remaining confined primarily to Iran and a few external strongholds without the widespread impact it wielded previously. In this scenario, Iran’s ability to instigate regional unrest or project power effectively would be significantly diminished, at least in the foreseeable future, as it struggles to regain strategic coherence and influence.
This challenging situation coincides with the aging of the supreme leader and the other leaders of Iran as well as their lack of political creativity and adaptability. As a result, it seems that Iranian strategists are facing a real dilemma in the details of governance. They have attempted to apply the same strategies used after the revolution to suppress their opponents and create concern and chaos, even for the Americans. However, these approaches no longer prove effective in the face of the current crisis Iran is undergoing.
While Tehran is grappling with a crisis stemming from the weakening of its influence abroad, it is also facing a domestic crisis, one characterized by the fragmentation of its popular support base. This is largely due to the erosion of the “conservative” faction’s popularity and the rise of the “reformists” to power, who seek to implement fundamental reforms to the structure of the government, particularly in the post-Khamenei era. As a result, Wilayat al-Faqih is caught in a real dilemma. The doctrine has become increasingly confined to the Iranian interior, and the supreme leader is no longer able to execute the threats he has repeated for three decades. The entire region, once considered part of his sphere of influence, now stands as a growing opponent to the revolutionary leadership.
In light of the Iranian supreme leader’s inferences, it can be concluded that there is no real desire to undertake a genuine reform in theory and practice of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine. Such reform would include an honest assessment and acknowledgement of the past mistakes and miscalculations that made Iran a loathed state in the region by governments and people. However, as this reform is unlikely given the Iranian supreme leader’s statements, Iran is likely to move forward with the same grim strategies and policies, hoping they will render different results.
