Azerbaijan and Iran seem to be readying up for a likely eruption of direct hostilities. The two neighbors have had an uneasy relationship since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Tensions have especially been soaring for the last year and a half. Recently, an Iranian fighter jet was alleged to have approached Azerbaijan’s airspace in a threatening manner. Baku summoned Tehran’s ambassador to hand over a demarche. “The flight of a military aircraft for more than half an hour near the liberated territories of Azerbaijan is [a] provocation and unfriendly behavior towards Azerbaijan,” Baku’s statement read.
Tehran has not attempted to de-escalate the tensions. Instead, it plans to amass troops equipped with mechanized artillery, missiles and drones under the pretext of holding new military exercises along the border of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave in the coming weeks. Since the armed attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and the killing of an official on January 27, Baku only maintains a consulate in Tabriz.
Tehran feels insecure about the increasingly assertive Baku which enjoys excellent trade and diplomatic ties with the West while banking on its immensely strategic location. Though the populous on both sides is predominantly Shiite, Azerbaijan identifies itself as a secular Turkic nation while Iran promotes Khomeini’s doctrine of Wilayat-al-Faqih. Azeri-Turks – Iran’s largest minority accounting for more than 30 percent of its population – feel nostalgic about neighboring Azerbaijan where people are free to learn the Azeri language and embrace their culture and traditions. Not only do the Azerbaijanis overwhelmingly reject the theocratic-sectarian narrative of Qom but Iran’s Azeri-Turks have plenty of resentment against Tehran’s ideological and administrative decrees. Their loyalty has come under question since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020.
After Azerbaijan triumphed in the 44-day war with Armenia, its border with Iran expanded by 130-kilometers which the Armenians had occupied since the 1990s. The main highway linking Iran to Armenia and a route to the Black Sea and Russia also fell into Azerbaijan’s hands with Baku imposing a heavy tax on Iranian trucks.
As per the Russia-mediated agreement, Armenia is required to provide a land corridor between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave in exchange for similar access through the Lachin corridor to Armenian-populated areas. Yerevan has been denying this access. Since such a corridor linking parts of Azerbaijan will undermine Iran’s value as a transit nation, Tehran agrees with its northern neighbor.
On March 22, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani visited Yerevan and held a meeting with Secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan. The latter briefed the Iranian diplomat about the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact and around Nagorno-Karabakh while other security issues threatening the region were discussed. Baku seems determined to connect its mainland to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. The delay in the implementation of the Russia-mediated agreement has only hardened nationalistic fervor on both sides. Despite being a staunch ally of Russia, Armenia has not been able to get the expected backing of Moscow. Disillusioned Armenia is instead turning toward Iran and the European Union (EU) to put pressure on Azerbaijan.
On January 23, Armenia’s interactions with the EU increased when a civilian monitoring mission under the Common Security and Defense Policy arrived to monitor the border region of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Approximately 100 civilians, including around 50 unarmed observers, will monitor the settled border region of Armenia and Azerbaijan for a term of two years. Iran welcomed the presence of the EU monitoring mission. For monitoring the disputed area, however, the EU mission requires Azeri approval which rejects its presence. Hence, the symbolic diplomatic move does little to address Yerevan’s primary security concern, however, the European presence could provide an early warning of an impending Azeri attack, possibly with some significant tactical information. Armenia already fears a spring attack in the disputed area.
Given Russia’s cold shoulder, Iran’s support for Armenia becomes vital. Whenever Yerevan is challenged by Baku, Tehran mobilizes troops along the border with Azerbaijan under the pretext of carrying out military exercises. Armenia realizes the limits of its cooperation with Iran, with its heavily sanctioned southern neighbor having limited clout, and constrained coffers. In the event of a conflict, Iranian drones, missiles and small arms could be used by Armenian forces. Baku routinely unearths weapons smuggling vehicles to parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which Yerevan denies.
For Iran, Armenia is a pretext to constrain its assertive Azeri neighbor, which just opened an embassy in Israel and remains its key arms importer. Another regional powerhouse, Turkey, is Azerbaijan’s strategic partner.
In the early weeks of spring, Iran’s combined arms drill along Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan border is not likely to be the surprise the strategic community is expecting. Tehran will not attack Baku’s exclave as it borders Turkey too. It will not bite off more than it can chew. The IRGC may open a surprise front on the newly liberated border region in a bid to show its force but without drawing Turkey’s and Israel’s involvement on the Azeri side. Or is Iran just saber-rattling to get Russia’s and China’s attention to help contain Azerbaijan? Tehran fears a domestic ethno-nationalistic movement arising in its northwest provinces in the near future. A full-scale war, which is extremely unlikely, or a limited fierce conflict with Azerbaijan can be akin to adding fuel to the fire. The people of Azerbaijan are enraged at Iran for the attack on its embassy whose investigations have not been to Baku’s satisfaction.
