Security Implications for Russia After the Fall of the Assad Regime

https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/?p=13219

ByRasanah

The fall of the Assad regime has ushered in a new era of uncertainty for Russia’s security calculus in the Middle East. As one of Syria’s most significant backers, Moscow’s military, intelligence and geopolitical strategies have long depended on an ally in Damascus to safeguard its interests. The Assad regime served multiple roles for Russia including, a gateway to regional influence, and a host for critical military infrastructure, including the naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim. Rasanah highlighted the strategic significance of Russia’s military infrastructure in Syria in an earlier publication.

With the current collapse of centralized authority, extremist factions may exploit the ensuing chaos to regroup and expand. This poses considerable risks for Russia, particularly given the flow of fighters from the North Caucasus to Syria. Estimates suggest that since the start of the Syrian civil war, up to 7,000 Russian nationals, primarily of Chechen and Dagestani origin, joined radical groups in Syria. Although coalition campaigns against ISIS significantly reduced this number, the remaining fighters may continue to pose a potential threat. The uncertainty surrounding their fate raises fears that some may return to Russia, bringing combat experience and radical ideologies. This prospect increases the risk of domestic security incidents, including potential attacks or the further radicalization of vulnerable groups within Russia. Moscow has already experienced significant terrorist incidents in 2024, including the Crocus City Hall attack which resulted in 145 casualties, and an attack in Derbent, Dagestan, that targeted police, security personnel and an Orthodox church, leading to 20 deaths and 46 injuries. The instability in Syria could exacerbate these security risks by serving as a base for extremist activities. Moreover, Syria’s proximity to the Caucasus and Central Asia raises the likelihood of cross-border extremist activity, especially in countries with weak governance and porous borders. While the scale and immediacy of these risks remain speculative, the potential for Syria to become a launching pad for radicalism presents a significant security concern for Russia. Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, addressed these concerns, emphasizing that the country is weary from war and poses no threat to its neighbors or to the West.

The fate of the Russian military bases in Syria remains uncertain. However, reports suggest that Moscow is engaging in direct negotiations with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).  A deal could enable Russia to maintain a presence at its two bases, preserving its strategic foothold despite Assad’s absence.  Sharaa stated that Russia and Syria share a long history of strategic partnership. He expressed a desire to maintain relations between the two countries in the future, hinting at the possibility of Russian military presence remaining in place Syria. Türkiye’s influence in post-Assad Syria is pivotal and intersects directly with Russia’s security concerns. As a regional power with substantial influence over HTS, Türkiye’s actions will shape the future balance of power in Syria. Ankara’s longstanding ambition to establish a buffer zone in northern Syria to curb Kurdish autonomy may expand after Assad’s fall, potentially intensifying Syria’s division. On the one hand, Türkiye’s support and influence over HTS complicates Moscow’s efforts to secure its military and strategic interests. On the other hand, Türkiye’s mediation could facilitate negotiations with HTS, potentially allowing Russia to retain its military bases despite regime change. The evolving dynamics between Russia and Türkiye underscore a complex interplay of cooperation and competition. These dynamics will define their engagement in a post-Assad landscape, carrying significant implications for Moscow’s regional strategy and security objectives.

In conclusion, the fall of the Assad regime presents challenges for Russia, particularly the threat of extremist groups exploiting the power vacuum in Syria. This poses risks to Russia’s internal security, with concerns about returning fighters and cross-border activities impacting the Caucasus and Central Asia. Assad’s absence does not fundamentally threaten Russia’s core strategic objective, which is the war in Ukraine, however, through pragmatic negotiations with HTS, Russia could potentially mitigate the aforesaid security risks while preserving its military foothold in the country.

Rasanah
Rasanah
Editorial Team