Following the killing of Ali Khamenei and the succession of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as Iran’s third supreme leader, the Iranian establishment entered an exceptionally sensitive phase. The challenges posed by the war and the nuclear agreement with the United States coincided with the crisis of power transfer, the continued absence of the new supreme leader from public view and intensifying competition among the presidency, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), seminaries and various political factions to interpret the younger leader’s statements and messages. These developments reveal aspects of the nature of the establishment, the sources of its legitimacy and the limits of the authority of its institutions and their ability to function in the absence of a central figure or balancing force that had traditionally managed the delicate balance among them.
Against this complex backdrop, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to the hawzas in Qom in late June 2026, and his meetings with a number of senior maraji (supreme legal authorities), scholars and hawza figures, went beyond the customary practice of presidential visits to the country’s foremost religious center. The visit was not merely intended to brief the maraji on developments related to the war or the negotiations. Rather, it appeared to be a political and religious maneuver aimed at restoring the establishment’s internal balance and securing hawza backing to ease the pressures facing the government following the US-Iran ceasefire agreement.
The visit came particularly in the wake of a letter issued by Mojtaba Khamenei, in which he stated that he had “another opinion” regarding the agreement but approved it on the basis of the president’s and the Supreme National Security Council’s pledge to safeguard Iran’s rights and assume responsibility for its consequences. That letter placed Pezeshkian in a difficult position. He subsequently traveled to Qom in an effort to broaden support for the agreement and demonstrate that negotiations are an option governed by the interests of the state and the requirements of the current phase, rather than by the personal will of the president or a departure from the principles upon which the republic was founded.
However, the significance of the visit extends beyond the relationship between the president and the supreme leader, or even the debate over the nuclear agreement alone. It reveals the position of the hawza within Iran’s power structure. Despite efforts to subordinate it and integrate it into official institutions, Qom remains a space in which diverse maraji and religious currents coexist, alongside the relatively independent traditional hawza establishment and the state-affiliated hawza aligned with Wilayat al-Faqih, which is linked to state institutions.
For this reason, Pezeshkian’s visit brought together traditional maraji, pro-regime jurists and the heads of official hawza institutions in an effort to accommodate this diversity and prevent the “hardliner” camp from monopolizing the discourse on religion, the hawza and the revolution. The visit also raises a deeper question concerning the nature of Wilayat al-Faqih in the post-Khamenei era. The continued absence of the new supreme leader and the reduction of his personal role are pushing, at least temporarily, toward a distribution of the functions of Wilayat al-Faqih among several actors.
This report examines Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom within its broader political and religious context and analyzes its implications for the legitimacy crisis surrounding the new supreme leader, the relationship between the presidency and the institution of the supreme leadership, the positions of the maraji on the agreement and the divergence between the traditionalist hawza and the government-affiliated hawza. It also seeks to assess whether these developments represent merely transitional arrangements imposed by the circumstances of the war and the absence of the supreme leader, or whether they point to a deeper transformation in the internal dynamics of power and the distribution of legitimacy within the ruling establishment which is based on Wilayat al-Faqih.
The Hawza as a Source of Legitimacy
The president visited the historic center of Shiism at a time when the supreme leader was entirely absent from the public scene. In this context, the visit represented a search for legitimacy from the religious establishment, through which Pezeshkian sought clearer moral and jurisprudential endorsement to preserve his public standing and strengthen his political legitimacy.
To better understand the context, Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed the third supreme leader of Iran on March 9, 2026 by a decision of the Assembly of Experts, as announced at the time. However, the transfer of the constitutional office did not automatically result in a full transfer of legitimacy. Although the new supreme leader inherited the institutions of the leadership and their security and religious networks, he did not inherit the historical authority and charismatic legacy that his father had accumulated over decades of ruling the state. This predicament was further compounded by Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence from direct public appearances.
In light of these circumstances, a central question arises: was Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom merely intended to brief the maraji on developments related to the war and the agreement, or did it constitute an effort to compensate for the supreme leader’s absence and his inability to meet with him, bridge the gap the supreme leader had created between the leadership and the agreement and rebuild the government’s legitimacy from within the religious sphere?
Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom was undoubtedly part of an underlying struggle within the establishment among competing factions holding different positions and seeking to consolidate legitimacy and public support. The leadership seeks to preserve its authority to authorize and supervise while avoiding the full political cost of the agreement. The presidency seeks to demonstrate that the agreement is an institutional decision rather than the personal choice of the president. The IRGC and the “conservative” camp seek to preserve their ideological and security veto power. Meanwhile, the maraji seek to support the stability of the state while requiring the government to adhere to the standards of public interest and safeguard people’s livelihoods.
The Crisis of Absence
The system of Wilayat al-Faqih assumes that the supreme leader is not merely a constitutional authority, but rather the central figure around whom the state’s institutions and ideological narrative are organized. Leadership in Iran is not limited to legal administration; rather, it represents a combination of jurisprudential authority, religious symbolism and military and political command.
During his decades in power, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei transformed the position of the supreme leader from a constitutional office into a personal center around which the networks of the army, IRGC, hawzas, media and the economy converged. He became the mechanism for balancing these institutions, the figure to whom they referred their disputes and the actor who managed their conflicts by leveraging and manipulating them in order to preserve his central authority and effectiveness.
Mojtaba Khamenei, however, assumed the position under entirely different circumstances. He did not emerge as a historical leader who had participated in the establishment of the political system or served as president before assuming the position of supreme leader; rather, he inherited a power network built by his father, the supreme leader. Consequently, his succession was confronted from the outset with two interconnected questions: the question of his religious qualifications and the question of political succession within a system theoretically founded on rejecting hereditary monarchy.
The election by the Assembly of Experts, as it was presented at the time, did not resolve these questions. Instead, it shifted them from the sphere of legal legitimacy to the sphere of religious and social acceptance. Official institutions sought to address this challenge by presenting an extensive religious biography of the new supreme leader, emphasizing his teaching of advanced jurisprudence (Bahth al-Kharij), his relations with maraji, his long experience in managing state affairs and his ties with the military establishment and the “Resistance Front.”
However, his public absence weakened the ability of the new leadership to translate this official narrative into tangible authority, at least in the short term. This absence is not merely symbolic, because a key part of the power of Wilayat al-Faqih has been based on the “political embodiment” of the concept of guardianship: namely, the supreme leader’s presence among his popular and traditional base of hawza students, jurists and officers; his delivery of speeches; his reception of officials, students and scholars; and his public intervention during critical moments.
Consequently, Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership has thus far appeared closer to a form of “textual leadership.” It manifests its presence primarily through written statements, messages attributed to him and official announcements issued by the Office of the Supreme Leader, while state institutions assume the role of explaining his positions and defending both his authority and his capacity to govern the country. This style may be understandable from a security standpoint during wartime; however, from a political perspective, it creates a substantial vacuum and opens spaces in which other institutions and actors can operate. Chief among these are the presidency, the IRGC and the religious seminaries. This appears to be the dynamic that Pezeshkian sought to exploit during his visit to Qom.
Between the President and the Supreme Leader
Mojtaba Khamenei’s letter regarding the agreement between Iran and the United States was issued on June 18, approximately 10 days before Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom. The letter is crucial to understanding the significance of the visit, as it did not present the agreement as a choice made by the leadership, but rather as a decision authorized by the leadership on the basis of commitments made by the president and the Supreme National Security Council.
Mojtaba Khamenei emphasized that he had, “in principle,” held a different view regarding the agreement, but granted approval due to the commitment made by Pezeshkian, in his capacity as head of the Supreme National Security Council, to safeguard the rights of the Iranian people and the “Resistance Front,” as well as his declaration of assuming responsibility for the consequences of the agreement. He further stated that the leadership and the Iranian people would await the fulfillment of the commitments and conditions pledged by the president.
The significance of the message lies in its separation between the authority to authorize and responsibility for the outcome. The supreme leader retained the position of ultimate authority, while attributing the initiative, commitment and accountability to Pezeshkian and the members of the Supreme National Security Council. In this way, the leadership could benefit from the agreement’s success, should it result in a ceasefire and the lifting of sanctions, while simultaneously distancing itself from responsibility and holding the government accountable if the agreement failed or if the United States violated its terms.
However, this separation between authorization and responsibility creates a constitutional dilemma. Article 176 of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that the Supreme National Security Council is convened under the chairmanship of the president, but it also states that its decisions cannot be implemented until they are approved by the supreme leader. This means that while Pezeshkian bears executive and political responsibility, the leadership cannot constitutionally portray the agreement as an independent presidential decision. Without the supreme leader’s approval, the decision would not have acquired executive force.
Therefore, Mojtaba Khamenei’s letter reflects political maneuvering more than a constitutional commitment. It represents an attempt to shield the new leader from the consequences of a controversial agreement at a time when his political and religious legitimacy has not yet been firmly established. It was also an effort to distance himself from controversy and debate generated by “hardliners” and radicals over the agreement, a dispute that complicated the situation, contributed partially to its failure and revived the prospect of renewed war.
Turning to Qom
Pezeshkian carefully selected the locations and figures involved in his meetings, bringing together both loyalist and traditionalist figures rather than relying on a single marja. This was an attempt to address their concerns over negotiations with the United States, while simultaneously sending a message to the “hardliner right” that he enjoys the support of the hawzas and the religious establishment across its various currents and orientations
Qom and the Balance Among Actors
Pezeshkian’s visit included meetings with Grand Ayatollahs Jafar Sobhani, Hossein Nouri Hamedani, Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Mousa Shabiri Zanjani, Mohammad Ali Alavi Boroujerdi and Karimi Jahromi, as well as the head of the hawzas, Ali Reza Arafi and members of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.
The diversity of these meetings indicates that the visit targeted various levels of the hawza system: traditional maraji, official hawza institutions, jurists affiliated with the state and religious circles closer to the “reformist” movement. Pezeshkian effectively navigated between two distinct paradigms within Qom: a traditional hawza deriving its authority from scholarship, tradition and networks of followers, and a revolutionary, institutional hawza linked to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and the state apparatus. By engaging with both sides, the president sought to prevent the “conservative” current from monopolizing the representation of religious opinion.
Sobhani’s position was of particular significance. He praised the government for assuming responsibility for implementing the agreement and called for consideration of the prevailing circumstances, while emphasizing the need to direct any economic gains toward improving citizens’ lives. His appreciation of “responsibility” reinterpreted the very element that the new supreme leader had used to shift the burden of accountability onto Pezeshkian. While the leadership presented the acceptance of responsibility as a basis for holding the president and his “reformist” or pro-government faction accountable, Sobhani framed it as a virtue and a courageous act of decision-making.
Hamedani combined support for the armed forces with a defense of the negotiators, emphasizing that those leading the negotiations should not be weakened or undermined. This position is significant because it challenges the dichotomy promoted by “hardliners” between the battlefield and diplomacy. Makarem Shirazi praised the state’s management during the war and addressed the potential positive effects of the agreement, while stressing the need to preserve dignity and avoid both excess and negligence in relations with foreign powers. He also emphasized the importance of coordination among state institutions, a position that directly supports Pezeshkian’s narrative that the agreement was the result of institutional cooperation rather than a unilateral presidential decision.
Boroujerdi was the most explicit in expressing support for political realism. He described the president’s assumption of responsibility for the negotiations as a courageous act, affirmed that the country could not have been managed better under the prevailing circumstances and warned against wasting diplomatic opportunities. Zanjani also provided moral support for the government by referring to the weight of the unfair accusations directed against officials and emphasizing that their efforts were appreciated. His position did not represent a detailed endorsement of every clause of the agreement; rather, it constituted a rejection of the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding the government and its negotiating team.
From these positions, it can be concluded that Pezeshkian did not obtain a “political fatwa” endorsing the agreement clause by clause. However, he secured something that may prove more effective in the public sphere: recognition of the legitimacy of negotiations, rejection of accusations of betrayal against the negotiators, praise for the president’s assumption of responsibility and emphasis on the priority of national interests, political realism and the requirements of the current circumstances.
Divisions Within the Hawza
Despite this support, a unified or cohesive hawza position cannot be assumed. The Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, one of the most prominent hawza institutions affiliated with the revolutionary movement, issued a statement following the supreme leader’s message, emphasizing the need for political forces to align their positions and analyses with the leadership’s directives and renewing their allegiance to Mojtaba Khamenei.
This statement reflects a current within Qom that interprets the agreement through the lens of obedience to the supreme leader, rather than through the independence of the Shiite marjaya or an independent assessment of political interests. During his lengthy meeting with members of the association, Pezeshkian was compelled to provide a detailed explanation of the state’s decisions, the agreement and the country’s economic and cultural challenges. The association described the meeting as frank and detailed, lasting more than two hours, suggesting that it included questions, criticisms and reservations from the “conservative hawza faction.”
On June 27, 2026, 63 out of 83 members of the Assembly of Experts issued an unprecedented statement describing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a “violation of officials’ commitments and a strategic mistake.” They called on Iranian negotiators to adhere to the “red lines” established by the supreme leader and demanded retaliation against the US president and the Israeli prime minister for the assassination of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
This marked the first time that the Assembly of Experts had intervened and expressed a position on issues beyond its constitutional mandate in the country’s executive and political affairs. However, on the sidelines of Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom on June 28, the Secretariat of the Assembly of Experts issued a statement emphasizing that the published statement was “unusual and unconventional” and that its content “requires further review and discussion.” This step partially reduced potential misunderstandings and prevented the statement from being regarded as an official position of the Assembly of Experts.
Thus, the president’s visit to Qom represented a move within a divided hawza system. Traditional maraji provided the president with political and moral support, while official hawza institutions sought to reinforce the primacy of the leadership and ensure that government actions remained within its framework. This division reflects the longstanding distinction between the “religious establishment,” which possesses relatively independent scholarly and social legitimacy, and the “state-run hawza,” which represents the religious and ideological extension of the state.
Pezeshkian sought to draw on the former without confronting the latter. Therefore, throughout his meetings, he repeatedly praised the leadership and the armed forces while simultaneously defending negotiations and the agreement.
“Hardliners” and the Battle to Interpret the Supreme Leader’s Message
“Hardliners” opposing the agreement found in Mojtaba Khamenei’s message an opportunity to reopen the debate over its content. Kayhan newspaper interpreted the supreme leader’s statement that he “has another opinion” as evidence of shortcomings and unacceptable provisions within the text. It criticized the inclusion of nuclear issues and the Strait of Hormuz in the agreement and called for fundamental amendments within the specified timeframe.
Kayhan’s position was not limited to opposition to specific clauses; rather, it transformed the supreme leader’s message into a tool for political oversight of the president. The newspaper interpreted the phrase “another opinion” as a negative assessment of the agreement, whereas Pezeshkian interpreted it as a previous disagreement that had been overcome through institutional decision-making and the approval of the leadership.
Thus, the internal conflict within the establishment became a struggle over the interpretation of the absent supreme leader’s words: did he approve the agreement because he had become convinced of its necessity, or did he authorize it under pressure from the assessments of the government and the Supreme National Security Council? Does Pezeshkian’s acceptance of responsibility mean that the agreement has become official policy that must be supported, or does it mean that the president is now being tested, with the consequences of failure placed upon him?
The supreme leader’s absence from direct public appearances allows each side to advance its own interpretation of the text. A visible leadership can intervene to define meaning and control competing interpretations, whereas leadership expressed only through written messages leaves greater room for interpretive disputes.
Behind this dispute stands the military establishment, which has a vested interest in ensuring that the agreement does not undermine the logic of deterrence, diminish its role in shaping foreign and security policy or erase the gains it achieved during the war. Therefore, Pezeshkian was careful to emphasize that the government and the armed forces are not separate entities, and that the agreement reflects, rather than contradicts, the achievements made on the ground. This reflects his understanding that the success of diplomacy requires containing the military establishment, not merely securing the supreme leader’s approval or obtaining the endorsement of the maraji.
Significations of Qom’s Unique Influence
It can be argued that the Iranian president’s visit to Qom holds significance, as it demonstrates Qom’s influence, centrality and position within the Iranian political system, as well as its current role as a balancing force between competing factions.
Transformations of Wilayat al-Faqih
These developments reveal a deeper transformation in the nature of Wilayat al-Faqih. During the eras of Khomeini and later Ali Khamenei, authority was concentrated in the hands of the supreme leader as an individual, with the supreme leader combining ideological authority, military leadership, the formulation of general policies and arbitration between state institutions. However, in the current phase, the new supreme leader’s continued absence from public view is pushing the system, at least temporarily, toward a different model: the distribution of authority and the division of roles. Under this model, the supreme leader’s power does not disappear, but rather operates through a network of institutions. The Office of the Supreme Leader issues messages; the IRGC defines the boundaries of security and deterrence; the Supreme National Security Council makes decisions; the president manages administration and negotiations; the hawzas provide religious legitimacy; and the official media projects an image of cohesion and harmony.
Nevertheless, the remarkable rise of the IRGC cannot be ignored. Although these institutions collectively strengthen the position of the IRGC and armed forces, they continue to adhere to Wilayat al-Faqih and envision an “Islamic” Iran only through this framework. Indeed, they view the preservation of their internal and external networks of interests as dependent on the continuation of this same system of guardianship.
However, this form of guardianship will remain weak and fragile, not only because it was transferred to “Khamenei junior” during a period of war, followed by the growing influence of the IRGC and its expanding role in decision-making, but also because the current moment represents a transitional phase between one supreme leader and another. A similar transition occurred after Khomeini’s death and Ali Khamenei’s accession to the leadership, but the present situation is considerably more complex.
This complexity stems from several factors related to Mojtaba Khamenei’s personal characteristics and the broader transformations affecting the state, including issues of inheritance, scholarly qualifications, competence, charisma, generational differences, the condition of state institutions and the overall circumstances facing Iran.
In any case, this formula, or this temporary transformation in the concept of guardianship, may provide the establishment with a degree of flexibility by allowing multiple actors to operate within the system and preventing its collapse in the absence of a central figure. However, it also inherently increases the likelihood of conflict, divergence and imbalance due to the absence of charismatic leadership capable of resolving disputes among competing actors.
As a result, every strategic decision becomes the product of compromise among institutions and power centers, while every failure turns into a contest over assigning blame, accompanied by a lack of political accountability —particularly in the absence of a central authority to which all actors can ultimately turn.
The Supreme Leader Between Two Camps
Another significant indication of Qom’s role at this stage is the conflict between religious and political movements, as well as the escalating dispute within the “hardliner” movement itself. The Iranian supreme leader has sought to present himself as standing above both sides and belonging to neither movement.
The newspaper Kayhan, which is close to the supreme leader, argued through its Editor-in-Chief Hossein Shariatmadari that parallel lines never meet, yet both are “loyal lovers of the revolution.” He then added, “Contrary to geometric principles, they should meet and intersect here, now, immediately — not in infinity —and create a single line against the enemies of Islam, the revolution, and Iran.”
But what is the ideological foundation of these two movements? The first movement considers any action taken by politicians or negotiators that contradicts the supreme leader’s teachings unacceptable. It argues that current circumstances have forced the supreme leader to take steps he does not desire, and therefore such actions should neither be carried out nor accepted. In this view, it is as though the supreme leader has been deprived of his authority and ability to exercise power.
The second movement argues that everything taking place on the political scene, particularly the actions of negotiators and members of the Supreme National Security Council, occurs with the supreme leader’s direct knowledge, approval and endorsement. This movement insists that some apparent violations of the positions publicly declared by the supreme leader were carried out only after obtaining his permission. In other words, these individuals unintentionally acknowledge that many of the problems and alleged transgressions occurred with the coordination of the supreme leader himself. However, the reality — which the supreme leader seeks to uphold and which Shariatmadari also affirms — is that “the positions of both movements, unintentionally and unconsciously, undermine the elevated and sacred status of the supreme leader.”
Thus, the supreme leader seeks to distance himself from the conflicts among these movements, recognizing, along with those around him, the fragility of his legitimacy and his inability to fully dominate and extend his influence during the wartime period and the transitional phase.
At this point, Qom’s role expands, the number of actors operating within it increases, and political rivals turn to it as a source of judgment and reference. Qom itself may also face internal divisions between traditionalists and loyalists, and perhaps even among loyalists themselves, due to disagreements among the “hardliners” who look to certain loyalist maraji in Qom as their point of reference and source of support.
Conclusion
Throughout the history of the Iranian republic, presidents have made numerous visits to Qom, meeting with senior scholars and clergy and maraji-e taqlid (sources of emulation). This tradition is deeply rooted in the system’s emphasis on the necessity of continuous dialogue between political and religious institutions. However, in light of the transformations and developments within the Iranian establishment, these visits have acquired an increasingly strategic dimension, particularly following the harsh accusations and criticisms directed against the government by “hardliners.” It appears that the statements and positions of clergy and maraji-e taqlid have eased pressure on the government and demonstrated to “hardliners” that Pezeshkian’s administration continues to enjoy the support of a broad segment of the clergy and religious establishment.
Pezeshkian’s visit to Qom reveals that the relationship between the state and the hawzas is no longer merely a matter of protocol; rather, it has become part of a process of restructuring legitimacy within the Iranian establishment following the death of Ali Khamenei and the transfer of leadership to his son. The president’s visit to Qom came at a time when the new supreme leader appeared either unable or unwilling, for security reasons, to maintain the level of public presence traditionally associated with the institution of leadership. Meanwhile, “hardliners” sought to use his message regarding the agreement as a tool to criticize the government and hold it solely responsible for its consequences. Therefore, the meetings with clergy and maraji-e taqlid were not so much an attempt to escape from, or challenge, the authority of the supreme leader, but rather an effort to broaden the base of decision-making and demonstrate that the negotiations were not merely a presidential decision, but a choice dictated by the requirements of the state and the public interest, while enjoying significant religious and hawza acceptance.
However, the visit also revealed that Qom is not a monolithic entity with a single unified voice. The clergy and maraji-e taqlid provided the government with moral and political support, defending the legitimacy of negotiations and rejecting accusations of treason against the negotiators. Meanwhile, the hawzas affiliated with the establishment maintained their emphasis on the primacy of the supreme leader and the necessity of subjecting political action to his directives. This divergence reveals a deeper conflict over the limits of obedience to the supreme leader, and whether religious legitimacy is derived exclusively from the institution of leadership, or whether it remains distributed among the supreme leader, the clergy and maraji-e taqlid, the traditional hawzas and state institutions.
In any case, the system of Wilayat al-Faqih does not appear to have definitively transitioned from individual leadership to collective or institutional leadership. Nevertheless, the current landscape confirms that the system is experiencing a period of fragility and restructuring. The supreme leader retains the authority to authorize decisions, the IRGC is expanding its influence in the military and security spheres, the president bears the burden of administration and negotiation, while the hawzas return to their role of providing legitimacy, guiding the course of events and protecting the state from fragmentation.
